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INTRODUCTION
The issue that I have chosen to address is whether Bilateral Investment
Treaties ("BITs") and Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") are drafted with
sufficient clarity to give guidance to arbitral tribunals. I will say at the very
outset that, in my view, the answer to this question is a resounding no.
This problem has become more and more apparent with the large
increase in the number of disputes submitted to the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") tribunals based
* Professor Emeritus, Universities of Louvain and Namur (Belgium); Member of
the Brussels and Paris Bars; Partner, Hanotiau & van den Berg, Brussels and
Singapore.
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on BITs in particular.' This increase in the number of disputes submitted
and the corresponding publication of resulting awards have demonstrated
that arbitral panels often interpret BITs inconsistently with the consequence
that there is a lack of clarity and transparency as to the nature and extent of
the commitments made by the States vis-iA-vis foreign investors.
Why is there such inconsistency between arbitral tribunals? The main
reason is that many of the BITs, particularly the older ones, are not drafted
with sufficient clarity. The provisions are generally vague.2  They are
comparable to general clauses in civil codes such as "good faith" or "bonos
mores" that allow the decision maker to ascertain the normative content
and the precise standards applicable to certain situations. In this respect,
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties provides that
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.",3 But what if the actual terms of the treaty
are unclear or are ambiguous? In these circumstances, the arbitrator will
have difficulty determining the meaning to be given to the terms or to the
intent of the negotiators. Furthermore, BITs are written in multiple
languages and this tends to accentuate the interpretive problems even
further. Specifically, the lack of precise linguistic equivalence and
differences in legal systems throughout the globe make it "virtually certain
that multiple language versions will include terminological differences that
lead to conflicting interpretations of the text."4
Lack of clarity leads to inconsistent decisions and inconsistency creates
uncertainty and damages the legitimate expectations of investors and
States.5 Investors that have structured their investments in a manner
1. See The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, ICSID at 7 (2015),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%2OWeb%2
OStats%202015-1%20(English)%20(2) Redacted.pdf (indicating that between 2000
and 2014, ICS1D registered over 430 new investment disputes, as compared to just 66
in total between 1965 and 2000).
2. See Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties: A Review,
UNCTAD Series on Int'l Investment Policies for Dev. at 3 (2005), http://unctad.org/en/
Docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf (noting that "the rather vague language of some treaty
provisions (e.g. the fair and equitable treatment standard) and the increasing
complexity of [International Investment Agreements] can make the outcome of
arbitration less predictable") (internal quotations omitted).
3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 (1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
4. Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual
Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (1997) (explaining further
that "language as a means of communication is fraught with ambiguities, mistakes, and
deception.").
5. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDIIA, L.
REV. 1521, 1558 (2005)[hereinafter The Legitimacy Crisis]; see also Susan D. Franck,
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designed to take advantage of the protection afforded by investment treaties
suddenly discover that they will not receive those benefits. 6 Likewise,
States find themselves in an untenable position of having to try to explain
to tax payers why they are subject to damages of hundreds of millions of
U.S. dollars in one case but not in another.
There have been numerous examples of inconsistent decisions over what
essentially amounted to the same dispute.8 For example, in the Lauder
arbitration, a Stockholm tribunal held that the Czech Republic breached a
variety of its obligations to the Dutch corporate arm of a U.S. investor
under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT. 9 Only ten days previously, on
exactly the same set of facts, a London tribunal held that the Czech
Republic only discriminated against a United States investor in violation of
the United States-Czech Republic BIT. 0 The relevant provisions in the
two treaties were identical. This inconsistency has presented challenges.
After the Lauder awards, there was speculation that the Czech Republic
might consider pulling out of its BITs. 
11
Another example of inconsistent cases is the SGS cases. 12  Both the
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT and the Switzerland-Philippines BIT contained
an umbrella clause.' 3 The issue confronting the arbitrators in both cases
was whether an umbrella clause in a treaty transforms a breach of contract
The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 63
(2005) [hereinafter The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights] ("Inconsistency
tends to signal errors, lends itself to suggestions of unfairness, creates inefficiencies,
and generates difficulties related to coherence, most notably a lack
predictability, reliability, and clarity.").
6. The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1545 (noting that there are three typical scenarios under which
inconsistent decisions generally arise: (1) "different tribunals can come to different
conclusions about the same standard in the same treaty;" (2) "different tribunals
organized under different treaties can come to different conclusions about disputes
involving the same facts, related parties, and similar investment rights;" and (3)
"different tribunals organized under different investment treaties will consider disputes
involving a similar commercial situation and similar investment rights, but will come to
opposite conclusions.").
9. Id. at 1559.
10. Id.
11. The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights, supra note 5, at 61.
12. See generally SGS Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004); SGS Socit6 G~ndrale de
Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of August 6,
2003, 18 ICSID Rev. 307 (2003); 42 I.L.M 1290 (2003).
13. See The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1568-69 ("Umbrella clauses are
designed to protect investors' contractual rights against interference from a breach of
contract or an administrative or legislative act.").
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into a breach of treaty.1 4 The Pakistan tribunal definitely said no, and the
Philippines tribunal said yes. This was quite astonishing15 since both
awards dealt with an umbrella clause that was presumably borrowed from
one sole model, the Swiss model.
Such cases are not isolated incidents. Argentina has been subject to
multiple treaty claims related to its currency crisis.1 6 These different claims
have resulted in divergent applications of the same or similar treaty
provisions and different conclusions regarding liability for the same
government conduct.
There have also been inconsistent decisions in cases under the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 17 For example the three
cases S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Metalclad v. Mexico, and Pope & Talbot
v. Canada used different approaches to determine how the standard of fair
and equitable treatment should be interpreted and applied. 8
This lack of consistency is a big problem. Without the clarity and
consistency of the rule of law and its application, some scholars note that
"there is a detrimental impact upon those governed by the rules and their
willingness and ability to adhere to such rules, which can lead to a lack of
legitimacy."1 9 If there is no predictability, possibility of reliability, or legal
certainty, companies and governments cannot anticipate how to comply
with the law and plan their conduct accordingly, thereby undermining
legitimacy.
2 0
How can this problem be addressed? One possible solution recently
adopted by the three NAFTA countries was to issue an Interpretative Note
regarding the obligation under Article 1105(1) to treat NAFTA investors
"in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment .. ,2 The Free Trade Commission ("FTC"), a body composed
of representatives of the three State parties, can adopt binding
interpretations of the treaty.22 The FTC declared in the Interpretative Note
that Article 1105 of the Treaty only encompassed the minimum standard of
14. Id. at 1569.
15. Id. at 1574 (noting that, "[e]ven though the Philippines tribunal had the
opportunity to consider the Pakistan award and discussed the case in its own decision,
reconciling the two awards is challenging").
16. See The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights, supra note 5, at 62.
17. See generally The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1575-82.
18. See generally id.
19. See id. at 1584.
20. See id
21. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1105(1), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA].
22. Id. art. 2001(1).
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treatment in customary international law.23 Since this note was issued,
24NAFTA tribunals have applied Article 1105 in a more uniform fashion.
Similar provisions requiring tribunals to decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with applicable rules of international law are found in many
BITs and FTAs. For example, Article 30(3) of the United States Model
BIT (both 2004 and 2012) provide for a mechanism that is similar to the
one in the NAFTA .
Other examples include Article 27(2) of the investment chapter of the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement ("AANZFTA"),
which authorizes a tribunal to request a joint interpretation by the parties of
any provision of the agreement. 26 Furthermore, Article 27(3) establishes
the binding nature of that joint interpretation. 27
This method is efficient, but it has one notable detractor: states may
strive to issue official interpretations in an attempt to influence proceedings
to which they are parties. 28 As the example of the July 2001 interpretation
of the FTA under NAFTA demonstrates, the home states of disputing
investors are more interested in protecting state respondents than protecting
their own nationals when it comes to treaty interpretation. 29 This is why
commentators and jurists have expressed concern about the legitimacy of
these interpretative mechanisms.
Putting these interpretative mechanisms to one side, what are the other
23. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapterl 1 Provisions (July 31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/
CH1 lunderstandinge.asp ("Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another Party."); see generally id. art. 1105(1),
(2)(c); The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1581-82.
24. The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1582.
25. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 30(3) (2012),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf ("A joint decision of the
Parties, each acting through its representative designated for purposes of this Article,
declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal,
and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint
decision."); see also 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 30(3) (2004),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
26. Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, art. 27(2) (Feb. 27,
2009), http://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/22260.pdf ("The tribunal shall...
request a joint interpretation of any provision of this Agreement that is in issue in a
dispute.").
27. Id. art. 27(3) ("A joint decision of the Parties, declaring their interpretation of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award
issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.").
28. Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1201 (Peter T Muchlinski,
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
29. Id.
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possible solutions? Various suggestions have been made. Some
commentators have, for example, suggested replacing investor-State
arbitration with a mechanism that would require such claims to be brought
before a permanent judicial body, perhaps something akin to the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 30 While this would help to create a
coherent body of investment treaty jurisprudence, there would be still no
check on the court's discretion should the court simply get it wrong. In
other words, shifting disputes to a permanent court will not completely
solve the problem.
Another suggestion is to allow parties to have the option of submitting a
question to a court in the manner of a preliminary ruling like the one
provided by article 234 of the EU Treaty. 31 Another option would be to
create a system of appeal or an appellate body that would focus on
establishing a clear and coherent body of law and would correct legal errors
in specific cases. It has even been suggested that the ICJ have appellate
jurisdiction over'investment treaty cases. But this would only prolong the
procedure by several years and still increase the cost of these types of
cases, which is already very high and heavily criticized.
In my view, it is better to tackle the problem from its root. We should
look at the actual BITs themselves. The best solution to the problem
resides in the drafting process. The goal is to create treaties that accurately
capture the intent of the contracting states and then articulate those
intentions in a form that can be appropriately interpreted in future relations.
One of the ways to implement this method involves working backwards,
identifying the flaws in arbitral interpretation, and hypothesizing ways to
avoid them when constructing the document itself. It is only through
awareness of how treaties are interpreted that the drafting process can be
amended.
To put it differently, by providing enhanced textual clarity about the
meaning of substantive rights, or more precisely, by providing detailed
definitions of all the relevant legal terms, arbitrators will have better
guidance thus leading to a more consistent interpretation of treaty
provisions. 32 For instance, if investment treaties guarantee freedom from
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, states might include clear and
precise definitions for the terms "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" in these
30. See e.g., Charles H. Brower, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment
Chapter, 35 VAND. J. TRANSAT'L L. 37, 90 (2003).
31. Treaty on the European Union, art. 234, Feb. 26, 2001 ("Where such a
question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.").
32. See The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights, supra note 5, at 84.
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treaties.33
Such an approach has two benefits. First, it permits states to choose what
rights they wish to grant to investors.34  Second, by elucidating the
parameters of investors' substantive rights, this approach brings more
textual clarity to an individual treaty, and this will in turn generate a more
consistent interpretation of its provisions.35 Of course, this approach is not
without its problems. 36 There is a risk that over-definition of rights might
generate more issues for litigation, which also in turn would lead to more
inconsistency. 37 Not to mention the fact that renegotiating the terms of
thousands of BITs presents political challenges and looks impractical.38
But in my opinion, it still remains the better approach.
I will now test this proposal by examining older and more recent BITs in
five areas: the notion of investment, fair and equitable treatment, full
protection and security, the most favored nation ("MFN") clause, and
expropriation.
II. AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION: THE NOTION OF
INVESTMENT
The definition of "investment" is important in ICSTD arbitrations
because unless an asset or an economic activity constitutes an investment
under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, it is not subject to ICSID
jurisdiction. 39 Unfortunately, the drafters of the ICSID Convention chose
not to define the meaning of investment within the Convention, generating
significant debate. The five criteria retained in the Salini award4° have
33. See id.
34. Id. at 85.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Brower, supra note 30, at 87-88 (explaining several problems that
arise in drafting "perfectly clear rules," including the inability of negotiators to capture
a complex balance of stakeholder interests in simple rules, the potential for such simple
rules to produce absurd results at the margins, and the potential for creating "a sense of
constructive indeterminacy and a paradoxical reduction of legitimacy.").
37. The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights, supra note 5, at 85.
38. Id.
39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 ("The jurisdiction
of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,
between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting
State").
40. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001) (identifying five criteria indicative of the existence of
an investment, including: (1) substantial commitment or contribution, (2) duration, (3)
assumption of risk, (4) contribution to economic developing, and (5) regularity of profit
and return).
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been referred to in many cases but nowadays, at least two of these criteria
are no longer considered relevant by many. I will not dwell on this since
we are concentrating on BITs. I will instead concentrate on the definition
of investment in those BITs. However, I wanted to make the point that
since arbitral tribunals generally recognize that there is a double barrel test,
the absence of a definition of "investment" in the ICSID Convention
complicates matters and explains why in ICSID arbitrations, sometimes
more than half of the submissions, which often means several hundred
pages, are only devoted to jurisdiction and, in particular, to the issue of
whether there is a protected investment.
Indeed, most BITs traditionally aimed at protecting investments.41
Therefore "investment" was defined in a way that was both broad and
open-ended, covering "not only the capital that has crossed the borders, but
also practically all other kinds of assets invested by an investor in the
territory of the host country. ' '42  A significant number of BITs have
included a standard definition of "investment," covering "every kind of
asset" owned or controlled by an investor of another party.43 This broad
definition of "investment" is typically complemented by an illustrative list
of assets that are included within the definition.44 Such list commonly
includes five categories of assets: movable and immovable property,
interests in companies (including both portfolio and direct investment),
45
contractual rights, intellectual property, and business concessions.
This kind of approach can still be found in recent draft BITs, like the
2006 French Model BIT.46  In such an approach, not only is the list of
assets in the definition non-exhaustive, but the use of broad generic terms,
such as "every kind of assets," "movable and immovable property,"
41. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking 22 (2007).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 2006 French Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 1(a)-(e) (2006)
(defining the term "investment" to mean "every kind of assets, such as goods, rights
and interests of whatever nature, and in particular though not exclusively: (a) movable
and immovable property as well as any other right in rem such as mortgages, liens,
usufructs, pledges and similar rights; (b) shares, premium on share and other kinds of
interest including minority or indirect forms, in companies constituted in the territory
of one Contracting Party; (c) title to money or debentures, or title to any legitimate
performance having an economic value; (d) intellectual, commercial and industrial
property rights such as copyrights, patents, licenses, trademarks, industrial models and
mockups, technical processes, know-how, trade names and goodwill; (e) business
concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for,
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources, including those which are located in the
maritime area of the Contracting Parties.").
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"claims to money," can complicate the issue of whether the transaction
falls within one of the categories of investment protected by the BIT.
In recent years, the way the notion of investment has been interpreted by
some arbitral tribunals has created great concern in some countries. Some
of these interpretations have been considered too broad and go beyond
what the contracting parties considered an "investment" when negotiating
the BIT. For instance, in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal found that
a market share through trade could be regarded as part of the assets of an
investment.47  And in S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal held that the
establishment of a sales office and the carrying out of marketing constituted
a sufficient investment. Experience has shown the risk of having an
extremely broad and unqualified definition of investment.
Another problem is that, at times, the definition itself lacks clarity. As
chairman of an arbitral tribunal, I recently encountered this problem in an
ICSID case. The Germany-Sri Lanka BIT provides in its Article 1: "1.
The term "investment" comprises every kind of asset, in particular: ... (c)
claims to money which has been used to create an economic value or
claims to any performance having an economic value and associated with
an investment. ' '49 We were confronted with the issue of whether the phrase
"claims to money which has been used to create an economic value" could
stand on its own or whether it was required to be associated with a separate
investment in order to qualify for protection. The majority of the Tribunal
decided that the categories enumerated (which included "claims to money
which has been used to create an economic value") were an illustrative list
of assets every kind of which was considered to be an investment and that
defining an investment by reference to investment would be a circular
reasoning. We could not reach unanimity on this solution. It is clear that if
the terms of the provision had been expressed with more clarity, this debate
would not have taken place.5 °
So what is the solution to this issue? One form of approach is for the BIT
signatories to adopt negative definitions of an investment. For example, the
2012 United States Model BIT provides the following:
Some forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, and long-term notes, are
more likely to have the characteristics of an investment, while other
forms of debt, such as claims to payment that are immediately due and
47. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 96 (June 26, 2000).
48. See Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties supra note 2, at
16.
49. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Germany-Sri Lanka, Feb. 25, 2002, art. 1.
50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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result from the sale of goods or services, are less likely to have such
characteristics.
51
Whether a particular type of license, authorization, permit, or similar
instrument (including a concession, to the extent that it has the nature of
such an instrument) has the characteristics of an investment depends on
such factors as the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has
under the law of the Party. Among the licenses, authorizations, permits,
and similar instruments that do not have the characteristics of an
investment are those that do not create any rights protected under
domestic law. For greater certainty, the foregoing is without prejudice to
whether any asset associated with the license, authorization, permit, or
similar instrument has the characteristics of an investment.
5 2
The term "investment" does not include an order or judgment entered in
a judicial or administrative action.
53
Similarly, the Chile-Korea FTA also provides that neither "claims to
money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods
or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an
enterprise in the territory of the other Party; or (ii) the extension of credit in
connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing;" 54 nor
"an order entered in a judicial or administrative action" 55 are included in
the definition of "investment."
Another way of avoiding an overly broad definition of investment is to
use a "closed-list" definition, consisting of a varied but finite list of
tangible and intangible assets. Originally envisaged in the context of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, this approach evolved
56towards the definition used in Article 1139 of the NAFTA. Subsequently,
the "closed-list" approach has been frequently used by several countries in
the definition of "investment" in their BITs. For example, Article 96 of the
Free Trade Agreement between Japan and Mexico illustrates this approach
in its definition of "investment."5 7 The definition includes such categories
51. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 25, art.1 n. 1.
52. Id. art. 1 n. 2.
53. Id. art. 1 n. 3.
54. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-S. Kor., Feb. 15, 2003, art 10.1(i).
55. Id. art 10.1(j).
56. NAFTA, supra note 23, art. 1139 (defining investment by limited terms and
providing certain exceptions so long as the kinds of interests set out in the finite list are
not involved).
57. The Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, Jap.-Mex., art. 96, Sept. 17, 2004,
(defining "investment" to a closed list of eight limited categories, including (1) an
enterprise; (2) an equity security of an enterprise; (3) a debt security of an enterprise;
(4) a loan to an enterprise; (5) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to
share in income or profits of the enterprise; (6) an interest in an enterprise that entitles
the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on dissolution; (7) a real estate or
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as "a debt security of an enterprise (a) where the enterprise is an affiliate of
the investor, or (b) where the original maturity of the debt security is at
least three years, but does not include a debt security, regardless of original
maturity of a Party or a state enterprise" 58 and "a loan to an enterprise (a)
where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (b) where the original
maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not include a loan,
regardless of original maturity, to a Party or a state enterprise., 59 The text
concludes with the limiting language presented above in the Chile-Korea
FTA.60
In the face of such a specific definition of investment that already
indicates the duration (three years) of certain types of investment, an ICSID
tribunal will not be able to contradict the BIT when assessing whether the
duration characteristic under Article 25 has been fulfilled for a loan or debt
security to an enterprise. 61 The closed-list of investments also indicates to
some extent what sort of risk or commitment is acceptable as an investment
and the tribunal should also take that into account in considering whether
the Article 25 definition has been fulfilled.62
During the last decade, the "closed-list" definition of "investment" has
also begun to be used in the context of BIT negotiations. 63 In 2004, Canada
abandoned the asset-based definition of "investment" in its foreign
investment protection and promotion agreements and opted to incorporate
into its new Canadian Model BIT a relatively detailed "closed-list"
definition of "investment. " 64 In addition to being finite, the list contains a
series of specific clarifications to prevent the application of the agreement
to certain kinds of assets that would otherwise fall under the definition of
investment. 65  The Canadian Model BIT that defines investment by
utilizing nine categories, 66 the same type of approach used in the Japan-
other property, tangible or intangible, and any related property rights; and (8) interests
arising from the commitment of capital or other reasons in the Area of a Party to
economic activity in such Area).
58. Id. art. 96(CC).
59. Id. art. 96(DD).
60. Supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
61. Michael Hwang & Jennifer Fong Lee Cheng, Definition of "Investment" - A
Voice from the Eye of the Storm, 1 ASIAN J. OF INT'L L. 99, 126 (2011).
62. Id.
63. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking,
UNCTAD at 73 (2007), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20073 en.pdf.
64. Id. See generally 2004 Canadian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. I(I)-
(IX) (2004).
65. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking,
supra note 63, at 73.
66. 2004 Canadian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 64.
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67
Mexico FTA, and it continues
For greater certainty:
(i) a loan to, or debt security issued by, a Party or a state enterprise
thereof is not an investment; and
(ii) a loan granted by or debt security owned by a cross-border financial
service provider, other than a loan to or debt security issued by a
financial institution, is an investment if such loan or debt security meets
the criteria for investments set out elsewhere in this Article.
68
The definition includes the same exclusions concerning certain claims to
money and also any other claims to money that do not involve those kinds
of interests expressly enumerated within the FTA.69
Another approach used to clarify the definition of "investment" has been
to qualify an otherwise very broad definition.70  Accordingly, numerous
recently negotiated BITs incorporate a definition of "investment" in
economic terms-that is, they cover, in principle, every asset that an
investor owns and controls but add the qualification that such assets must
have the characteristics of an investment. 71 For this purpose, they refer to
criteria developed in ICSID practice, such as "the commitment of capital or
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of
risk.",7 2 This approach is complemented by explicit exclusions of several
kinds of assets, which are not to fall within the category of covered
investments under the agreement.73
Article 10.1 of the Chile-Korea FTA illustrates that approach and
defines the term "investment" in the following manner: "investment means
every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly,
and that has the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment
of capital or other resources, the expectation of gains or profits and the
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. See 2004 Canadian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 64, art.
1 (v)(iii)-(iv).
69. Id. art. I(X)-(XI) ("[B]ut investment does not mean, (X) claims to money that
arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national
or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of the other Party,
or (ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade
financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraphs (TV) or (V); and (XI) any other
claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (1)
through (TX).").
70. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking,
supra note 63, at 73.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-
U.S., art. 10.28, Nov. 22, 2006.
73. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking,
supra note 63, at 73.
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assumption of risk., 74 The section continues by enumerating eight forms
that an investment may take, akin to those discussed above,75 and clarifying
through an exclusionary clause that certain kinds of money and of orders
entered in a judicial or administrative action do not qualify as an
investment.
The wording of this definition indicates that for an asset to be considered
a covered investment, a minimum of three conditions must be satisfied.7 6
First, it must be owned or controlled by an investor as defined by the
agreement; second, it must have the characteristics of an investment; and
third, it must not fall within any of the excluded categories.
77
The definition does not list all the characteristics that an asset must have
in order to be considered an investment.78 However, the definition does
include some minimum parameters, namely the commitment of capital, the
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.7 9 The inclusion of
these criteria within the definition of investment has the effect of excluding
ab initio certain assets: this would normally be the case for real estate or
other property, tangible or intangible, not acquired in the expectation, or
used for the purpose, of economic benefit or other business purposes.
80
III. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Despite its popularity, the precise legal meaning of the fair and equitable
standard has also been the subject of much debate. And in recent BITs and
FTAs, the negotiators have not only clarified the meaning of investment
but also of several key obligations like fair and equitable treatment or
expropriation.
The main problem concerning fair and equitable treatment is whether the
standard incorporates the international minimum standard required by
customary international law or whether it imposes other, possibly more
stringent, obligations on the host country.
81
Several old generation BITs are unclear in this respect. Either they grant
covered investments fair and equitable treatment without making reference
to international law or to any criteria to determine the content of the
standard; or they just provide that the fair and equitable standard shall not
74. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
75. See e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text.
76. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking,
supra note 63, at 74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1575.
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be less favorable than national treatment or most favored nation treatment
granted to the investment or the investor concerned; or they just refer to the
duty to abstain from impairing the investment through unreasonable or
discriminatory measures. Some BITs also make the fair and equitable
standard contingent on the domestic legislation of the host country.
More recent BITs and FTAs have clarified the issue. One example of
this is contained in the 2005 BIT between the United States and Uruguay
which provides in Article 5.1 that "[e]ach party shall accord to covered
investments treatment in accordance with customary international law,
including fair and equitable treatment .... 82 Article 5.2 goes on to state
that:
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard
of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of "fair
and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that
standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.
83
Another example is Article 11.5 of the Free Trade Agreement negotiated
between Australia and the United States, which begins much like the FTA
between the United States and Uruguay discussed above but goes on to say:
The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) "fair and equitable
treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil,
or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the
world .... A determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement,
does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article.
85
This provision is complemented by an annex that clarifies the
understanding of the parties regarding the concept of customary
international law as follows:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that "customary
international law" generally and as specifically referenced in Article 11.5
and Annex 11.B results from a general and consistent practice of States
that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article
11.5. the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
82. Treaty Between the United States and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru.,
art. 5.1, Oct. 24, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 272, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
agreements/bit/asset upload file748_9005.pdf.
83. Id. art 5.2.
84. Id. art. 5.2(a).
85. Id. art 5.3. Compare Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 11.5.3, May 18,
2004, KAV 6422 with id. art. 5.3.
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aliens refers to all customary international law principles that protect the
economic rights and interests of aliens.
IV. FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY
In many BITs, the standard of full protection and security is defined in
very broad terms. The most common expression is in the form of "full
protection and security." However, there are different variants such as
"constant protection and security," "protection and security," or "physical
protection and security," and this raises various issues.86 Does the word
"full" make a difference? Is it limited to physical violence? Or does it
impose a general duty upon States to prevent harm to the investment from
the acts of government and non-government actors? Generally speaking,
the more fundamental issue is whether the standard is a strict liability
standard or is limited to the customary international law standard to the
treatment of aliens.
Here again, a better drafting of the BITs would certainly help. A good
example is Article 5 of the United States Model BIT that provides:
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in
accordance -with customary international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security.
8 7
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments.
The concept of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.
The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide:
[ .... I
b) "full protection and security" requires each Party to provide the level
of police protection required under customary international law.
88
The United States Model BIT is therefore explicit in two ways. First, it
links the full protection and security standard to the minimum standard of
customary international law for the treatment of aliens. 89 Second, it refers
only to the level of police protection. It helps clarify the debate in recent
cases on the application of this standard beyond police protection.
90
Another approach is the ASEAN Investment Agreement of 2009 that
86. See generally Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security Standard
Comes of Age: Yet another challenge for states in investment treaty arbitration?, IISD
BEST PRACTICES SERIES at 2 (2011), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/201 l/full-protection.pdf.
87. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 25, art. 5.1.
88. Id. art. 5.2(b).
89. Malik, supra note 86, at 3.
90. Id.
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does not expressly refer to the standard of customary international law, but
it does note that full protection and security requires member States to take
such measures as may be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and
security of covered investments. 9' Thus, it clarifies that the standard does
not impose strict liability but a duty to take reasonable measures.
92
V. MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT ("MFN")
Many BITs contain an MFN clause. In early BITs, as national treatment
was not granted automatically, the inclusion of an MFN treatment clause
was generalized in order to insure that the host states, while not granting
national treatment, would accord a covered foreign investor a treatment that
is no less favorable than it accords to a third foreign investor and would
benefit from national treatment as soon as the country granted it.
93
Nowadays, the overwhelming majority of BITs have an MFN provision
that is granted alongside national treatment, mostly in a single provision.
94
In practice, violations or breaches of the MFN treatment per se have not
been controversial.95  However, an unexpected application of MFN
treatment in investment treaties has given rise to a debate that has not yet
been concluded and has generated different and sometimes inconsistent
decisions by arbitral tribunals. 96 The issue is the application of the MFN
treatment provision to import investor-State dispute settlement ("ISDS")
provisions from third treaties considered more favorable to solve issues
relating to admissibility and jurisdiction over a claim, such as the
elimination of a preliminary requirement to arbitration or the extension of
the scope of jurisdiction.97
The disputed issue goes back to Maffezini v. Spain where the tribunal
held that the MFN clause in the 1991 Argentina-Spain BIT could be used
by the claimant to circumvent an eighteen-month waiting period before
recourse to international arbitration was available.98 The claimant argued
that the third treaty concluded between Spain and Chile did not contain
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Most-Favoured-Nation-Treatment, UNCTAD(2010), http://unctad.org/en/Do
cs/diaeia20101 en.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 56 (Jan. 25, 2000) ("[I]f a third-party treaty contains
provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable ... than those in the
basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the [MFN]
clause .... ).
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such a requirement and that the investor State dispute settlement clause in
this third treaty was therefore less restrictive.99 It could then be imported
under the MFN clause contained in the basic treaty. l00 The tribunal found
that even though the MFN clause did not expressly refer to dispute
settlement, there were good reasons to conclude that dispute settlement
arrangements were inextricably related to the protection of foreign
investors. 101
This decision created an intense debate which is still on-going as to
whether MFN treatment includes access to international arbitration as
contained in the ISDS provisions of respective agreements. 10 2  The
Maffezini v. Spain approach was followed in a number of cases: Siemens v.
Argentina, Gas Natural v. Argentina, National Grid v. Argentina, A WG v.
Argentina; however, it was rejected by arbitral tribunals in other cases,
such as Wintershall v. Argentina, Salini v. Morocco, Plama v. Bulgaria,
Telenor v. Hungary, and Berschader v. Russian Federation.0 3  For
example, in Wintershall v. Argentina, the tribunal gave particular weight to
"consent" as the founding principle upon which jurisdiction is found. 104
The tribunal considered that the timing rule (the eighteen-month waiting
period) constituted "part and parcel of Argentina's integrated 'offer' for
ICSID jurisdiction," which should be "accepted by the investor on the same
terms." 10 5 The tribunal also based its decision on an analysis of the MFN
clause's wording and found that the treatment to which it extended did not
include dispute settlement. It considered that the application of the MFN
clause could not dislodge the dispute resolution provision in the basic treaty
unless the MFN clause in the basic treaty clearly and unambiguously
indicates that it should be so interpreted.
In Salini and Plama, the tribunals have based their decision on the
consideration that the contracting parties could not reasonably have
intended that jurisdiction would be formed through an incorporation by
reference, unless such intent had been explicitly reflected in the relevant
99. Id. 60.
100. Id. 54.
101. Id.
102. Most-Favoured-Nation-Treatment, supra note 93, at 69.
103. Id. at 73.
104. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14,
Award, 160(3) (Dec. 8, 2008) ("Besides, it is a general principle of international law
that international courts and tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over a State only with its
consent. The principle is often described as a corollary to the sovereignty and
independence of the State. A presumed consent is not regarded as sufficient, because
any restriction upon the independence of a State (not agreed to) cannot be presumed by
courts".).
105. Id. 162.
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provisions of the basic BIT.
Once again, the controversy concerning the application of the MFN
clause to dispute settlement provisions included in other treaties results
from the fact that, in many BITs, the clause is broadly framed. For
example: "[n]either contracting party shall in its territory subject
investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting Party to
treatment less favorable than that which it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments or returns of its own investors or to investments or returns of
its investors of any third states."
106
Another solution to the problem could be a better formulation of the
MFN clause, clarifying that it does not apply to any procedural provisions.
In other words, a second section could be added to the MFN clause
clarifying that "[f]or greater certainty, the obligation referred to in
paragraph 1 above shall not apply to [such and such articles or sections] of
this agreement." If you take for example the Chile-Colombia FTA of
2006, it provides in its Annex 9.3 that:
[T]he parties agree that the scope of application of Article 9.3 [the MFN
clause] only covers the matters related to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, administration, conduct, operation, sale or other disposition
of investments, and hence, does not apply to procedural issues, including
dispute settlement mechanisms such as that contained in section B of this
chapter. 107
This is probably the right approach to follow.
VI. EXPROPRIATION
In recent years, drafters of BITs have also ensured that greater clarity is
given to the definition of expropriation. The classic example of an
expropriation is an act that transfers ownership or possession of the
investment to the State.' 0 8 An act that completely destroys the value of an
investment is also typically regarded as an expropriation. °9 But more and
more often expropriation occurs through a series of actions rather than a
single act, 110 and consequently, many BITs have defined expropriation to
include measures that, taken together, are equivalent to, or have the same
effect as, an expropriation. Indeed, BITs include clauses that use the
following terms: "expropriation, nationalization and any other measure that
106. See e.g., 2008 U.K. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3(1) (2008).
107. Chile-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, Chile-Colombia, Annex 9.3, Nov. 28,
2006.
108. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Provisions in
Economic Integration Agreements, 107, U.N. Doc. A/CONF (Oct. 2005).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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has an effect tantamount to expropriation or nationalization;". "measures
that deprive the investor of their investment, either directly or indirectly;"
"expropriation or nationalization or similar measures;" "direct or indirect
expropriation or nationalization, or any other equivalent measure having an
effect similar to dispossession;" or still "shall not, directly or indirectly,
expropriate or nationalize or take any measure with equivalent character or
effect."' 
It is not clear from such language what degree of interference with
ownership rights is required for an act (or series of acts) to constitute an
expropriation. Furthermore, acts that only partially devalue an investment
may be viewed by the host country as routine regulatory acts that are not
the equivalent of an expropriation.
These problems are why recent BITs tend to contain provisions
clarifying two specific aspects. First, a text has been included in order to
make it explicit that the obligations regarding expropriation are intended to
reflect the level of protection granted by customary international law.
Second, such clarification has been complemented by guidelines and
criteria in order to determine whether, in a particular situation, an indirect
expropriation has taken place.
In this regard, modem BITs state that an adverse effect on the economic
value of an investment, as such, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred. It is further stated that, except in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a party aimed at
protecting legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 112
For example, Article 12 of the BIT between Mauritius and Comoros in
2001 states: "[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent a
contracting party from adopting any measure necessary to protect its
essential security interests or in the interest of public health or the
prevention of diseases affecting animals and plants."
' 13
Similarly, some investment treaty models used by European and
American countries contain clauses relating to protection of the
environment, health, and labor rights. This is true of the models used by
United States, Canada, Belgium, Finland, and Austria.
111. See Suzy H. Niki~ma, Best Practices Indirect Expropriation, IISD BEST
PRACTICES SERIES at 5 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/bestpracticeindirect_
expropriation.pdf.
112. See e.g., United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, Annex 10-D,
June 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-
text.
113. OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Mauritius 2014, OECD 108 (2014)
(quoting Article 12 of the Mauritius-Comoros Free Trade Agreement).
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The scope of such provisions is limited. They merely affirm the States'
sovereign rights to regulate in the public interest, which is already
recognized in customary international law. Often, these clauses that
reaffirm the States' rights to regulate do not stipulate whether the State is
relieved of its obligation to compensate in the event that the exercise of its
sovereign right harms the investor. But some of them are more carefully
drafted, as we will see in the following two examples that seem to be the
most comprehensive articles on expropriation.
The first one is Annex 10-D of the Free Trade Agreement between Chile
and the United States:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that:
(1) Article 10.9(1) is intended to reflect customary international law
concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.
(2) An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property
right or property interest in an investment. 
114
It then goes on to explain that the expropriation article addresses two
situations. The first is direct expropriation 115 and the second situation is
indirect expropriation."16 It further details:
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation,
requires a case-by-case, fact based inquiry that considers, among other
factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do
not constitute indirect expropriations.
117
This is a very comprehensive definition of expropniation." 8
114. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 112, Annex 10-D.
115. Id. Annex 10-D(3) (defining direct expropriation as "where an investment is
nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or
outright seizure.").
116. Id. Annex 10-D(4) (defining indirect expropriation as "where an action or
series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without
formal transfer of title or outright seizure.").
117. Id. Annex 10-D(4)(a)-(b).
118. See also Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zeeland Free
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CONCLUSION
It is obvious that many BITs and FTAs, particularly the older ones, are
not drafted in a sufficiently precise manner. This lack of clarity means that
arbitral tribunals do not have sufficient guidance when attempting to
interpret them.119 It is therefore essential that treaties be drafted in a more
precise manner in order to simplify the debate when a dispute arises or
even potentially eliminate a number of disputes. More precise drafting will
moreover permit to avoid inconsistencies and guarantee a higher level of
predictability and reliability for both investors and governments in their
efforts to comply with the law.
Trade Area, Annex on Expropriation and Compensation 2(a)-(b), Feb. 27, 2009,
http://www.asean.fta.govt.nz/assets/Agreement-Establishing-the-ASEAN-Australia-
Ne
w-Zealand-Free-Trade-Area.pdf (providing an identical definition of expropriation).
119. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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